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Concrete Control of Constitutionality in
Portugal: A Means Towards Effective
Protection of Fundamental Rights
Ant6nio Cortes* and Teresa Violante**
In Portugal, concrete control of constitutionality, approximately
equivalent to the United States concept of judicial review, is one of the
basic mechanisms available to individuals for the protection of their
fundamental rights. It is exercised by all Courts since they all have a
duty not to apply legal provisions which are in breach of the
Constitution.' The ConstitutionalCourt is the final instance of concrete
constitutional control.
The control of constitutionality by the
Constitutional Court in judicial cases takes place in a proceeding
designated "constitutionality appeal." It is not a procedural incident
and, accordingly, there is no staying of proceedings; it is a proper appeal
and, as such, presupposes a previousjudicial decision on the subject.
There is no specific mechanism that entitles an individual with
direct access to the Constitutional Court when faced with a violation of
his or her fundamental rights. There is no "individual constitutional
complaint" in Portugal like there is in Germany, Austria or Switzerland,
nor an appeal similar to the recurso de amparo that can be found in
Spain and countries in Latin America. This assertion, however, does not
imply that individuals are left without the possibility of judicially
defending their fundamental rights against specific offensive acts.
Firstly, all Courts are competent to check the constitutionality of a norm
against fundamental-rights provisions and principles. Secondly, there are
* Legal Clerk at the Portuguese Constitutional Court; Professor at the Law School
of the Portuguese Catholic University.
** Legal Clerk at the Portuguese Constitutional Court; Ph.D. Candidate at the
Faculty of Law of the New University of Lisbon.
1. An updated English version of the Constitutionof the Portuguese Republic (CPR
[Constitutional Law 1/1976, seventh amendment, according to Constitutional Law
1/2005]) and of the Law of the Constitutional Court (LCC [Law 28/82, 15 November])
may be found at http://www.tribunalconstitucional.pt/tc/en/home/html.
At the same
address it is possible to find most of the decisions of the Constitutional Court mentioned
in this article.
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special mechanisms designed for the protection against judicial decisions
depriving of liberty and administrative acts offending fundamental rights.
Lastly, the case law of the Constitutional Court is based on a wide
concept of norm, which allows for the consideration of the special typical
circumstances of the case.
The development of the concept of "norm" in the case law of the
Constitutional Court has been a matter of crucial importance. With the
acceptance of the control of normative interpretations,the "norm" is not
only a legal provision but tends to be the abstract result of the
interpretation. We could refer to it as a "norm of the case" (Fallnorm)in
the sense of Fikentscher 2 or a "rule" in the meaning of the ratio
decidendi of a decision in the Common Law systems. However, it has
not been a pacific phenomenon nor has it been immune to strong
controversy both amongst the Justices themselves and within the legal
doctrine. There are voices that label the results of this case law as the
creation, by the Court, of a system that draws the same results of the
individual constitutional complaint, even if these consequences exceed
the logic that presided over the creation of an exclusive normative
concrete control. Some even say that the "enlargement" of the concept
of norm has deployed results that go beyond those of a typical amparo
mechanism. This will be the object of this article.
A full understanding of the relative uniqueness of the Portuguese
system presupposes a basic knowledge of the control of constitutionality
as it has been established by the Constitution of 1976. Hence we will
start with a brief description of this system.
THE PORTUGUESE SYSTEM OF CONCRETE CONTROL OF
CONSTITUTIONALITY IN A NUTSHELL

I.

It is possible to divide the Portuguese system into two basic types of
(i) concrete control of
constitutional control mechanisms:3
unconstitutionality by all the Courts, including the Constitutional Court
and (ii) abstract control of unconstitutionality exclusively by the
ConstitutionalCourt. The Portuguese system intertwines characteristics
of both the American model of judicial review and the kelsenien model

DES RECHTS IN VERGLEICHEDENDER
IV 202 (Ttibingen 1977). See also Mota Pinto,
"Reflex6es sobre jurisdipto constitucional e direitos fundamentais. . . .", in THEMIS,
EDIICAO ESPECIAL: 30 ANOS DA CONSTITUICAO PORTUGUESA 1976-2006 212 (2006).
3. See Cardoso da Costa, A Jurisdiqdo Constitucional em Portugal, 2a ed., in
SEPARATA Do BOLETIM DA FACULDADE DE DIREITo 44 (Coimbra 1992) (considers this as
2.

See

FIKENTSCHER,

METHODEN

DARSTELLUNG: DOGMATISCHER TElL,

the basic distinction in the Portuguese system).
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of control of constitutionality. 4 This mixed character of the Portuguese
system provides for its relative uniqueness within the European systems
of control of constitutionality. There are similar mixed systems in other
Portuguese-speaking countries such as Brazil.5
Concrete control was introduced in Portugal with its first republican
Constitution in 1911.6 Concrete control was maintained during the
Constitution of the authoritarian dictatorship (1933-1974) and has lasted
until today's Constitution of the Portuguese Republic ("CPR"). Since its
first draft, concrete control has been, like the American model, diffuse,
incidental and concrete.7
We can add decentralized to these
characteristics. Ordinary courts shall not apply rules that are inconsistent
with the constitutional provisions or principles. This means that there is
a duty on the judiciary not to enforce rules that are in opposition to the
Constitution. Like the American model, developed from the judgment in
Marbury v. Madison, the Portuguese system is typically characterized by
its endorsement of the competence for the control of constitutionality to
the judiciary as a whole. The issues on the concrete control of
constitutionality of statutes are thus not reserved to a special jurisdiction.
All the courts are-for this purpose-constitutionalcourts. This means
that not only the Constitutional Court but also the Supreme Court of
Justice and the Supreme Administrative Court, as well as the other higher
and first instance courts, can refuse to enforce a legal rule on the grounds
of its unconstitutionality. The role of the Portuguese courts, when it
comes to concrete control, is not limited to allowing or refusing a
constitutionality appeal as happens, for example, in Italy or Germany.

4. See Vital Moreira, A Fiscalizaqdo Concreta no Quadro do Sistema Misto de
Justiqa Constitucional,in BOLETIM DA FACULDADE DE DIREITo DE COIMBRA. VOLUME
COMEMORATIVO Do 75.* ANIVERSARIO,. 815 (2003), Rui MEDEIROS, A DECISAo DE
INCONSTITUCIONALIDADE: Os AUTORES, 0 CONTEJDO E Os EFEITOs DA DECISAO DE
INCONSTITUCIONALIDADE DA LEI 17-18 & 54-57 (Lisboa 1999).
5. See BLANCO DE MORIAS, JUSTIuA CONSTITUCIONAL 11 992-1000 (Coimbra,
2005).
6. Portugal was the first country in Europe that formally admitted a system of
judicial review of legislation in the text of the Constitution (1911). It was directly
influenced by the Brazilian Constitution of 1891. See JORGE MIRANDA, CONTRIBUTO
PARA UMA TEORIA DA INCONSTITUCIONALIDADE 107 (2007); and MEDEIROS, supra note

4, at 12.
7. These concepts are used in the sense given by large legal doctrine. See GoMES
CANOTILHO, DIREITO CONSTITUCIONAL E TEORIA DA CONSTITUICAO, 898-901 (Coimbra

7th ed. 2003). Difuse because every judge is competent to assess the conformity of
norms with the Fundamental Law.
Incidental meaning that the problem of
unconstitutionality may only be assessed within a concrete dispute and as long as the
resolution of such problem is relevant to the settlement of the dispute. Concrete, in
connection with the previous two concepts, because the unconstitutionality is asserted
within a specific dispute and the judge has the duty to assess the consistency of the
applicable norms with the Constitution.
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Ordinary courts can rule on every constitutionality issue raised by the
parties. And ordinary courts can also raise such issues ex officio. This
means that, as a rule, when a dispute comes to the Constitutional Court,
there has already been at least one decision on the constitutionality
quaestio. And it may be the case that the parties have conformed
themselves with such decision and have chosen not to bring the case to
the Constitutional Court.'
When it comes to basic fundamental rights, even the Public
Administration may autonomously appreciate the constitutionality of
legal provisions. The possibility of the Public Administration accessing
the constitutionality of legal provisions it enforces or applies is
unanimously accepted as referring to basic rights, freedoms and
guarantees, set forth in Article 19(6) CPR: right to life, personal
integrity and identity, civil capacity and citizenship, the principle of nonretroactivity of criminal law, right of defence in sanctionary proceedings,
and freedom of conscience and of religion.9 It is also undisputed that the
Administration may refuse to apply a provision that has already been
declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court with general
binding force. However, there is more controversy regarding this
prerogative of the Administration when there is only one precedent
(without general binding force) of the Constitutional Court or of any of
the Supreme Courts, or when there is no previous judicial precedent at
all.'o
Despite having a diffuse system, Portugal has, since 1982, had a
Constitutional Court, i.e., a judicial body specifically designed to deal
with constitutional issues. Like in the kelsenian model, there is a court
specially created to deal with the issues of constitutionality. The
Constitutional Court constitutes a distinct category of courts within the
judicial system. It occupies the higher position of the constitutional
jurisdiction order, and its decisions cannot be appealed to any other
Portuguese court. Only the Constitutional Court has competence for the
abstract control of constitutionality, which means that it is within its
exclusive jurisdiction to declare a provision is unconstitutional with
general binding force.

8. But if there has been a judicial decision refusing to apply a norm because of its
unconstitutionality, there is an obligation for the Public Prosecutor's Office to lodge an
appeal persaltum to the Constitutional Court.
9. See JORGE MIRANDA, MANUAL DE DIREITO CONSTITUCIONAL VI 203 (Coimbra 3d
ed. 2008). Referring to all rights, liberties and guarantees, VIEIRA DE ANDRADE, OS
DIREITOS FUNDAMENTAIS NA CONSTITUIIAO DE 1976 350 (Coimbra 3d ed. 2006).

10. See MEDEIROS, supra note 4, at 167 (sustaining that in these situations, the
Administration may refuse to apply the legal provision).
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Furthermore, the Constitutional Court plays a central role in the
system of concrete control of constitutionality. In fact, there are certain
procedural rules that tend to centralise these proceedings in the
Constitutional Court.
First, it is up to the Constitutional Court to control the process of
selection of the cases it admits. This selection takes place in two
moments of admission: the decision of admission is first laid by the
court a quo (Article 76(1) Law of the Constitutional Court ("LCC")) and,
on later moment, by the rapporteur judge to whom the process has been
assigned in the Constitutional Court (Article 78-A(l) LCC). In both
cases it is possible to appeal to the conference of three judges of the
Constitutional Court the preliminary decision to refuse to admit the
appeal (Articles 76(4)(5) and 78-A(3) LCC). Second, as we will see, the
broad concept of "norm" developed by the Court as a condition of
admissibility expands the Court's activity and the control it exercises
over other courts. Third, when an ordinary judge refuses to apply a legal
norm on the ground of its unconstitutionality, the appeal is not only
possible (Article 280(l))(a) CPR and Article 70(a) LCC) but also
mandatory to the Public Prosecutor (Article 80(5) LCC). Finally, if there
is an applicable precedent of the Constitutional Court, an appeal may be
lodged even if the parties have not raised the question during the
proceedings (Article 70(c) LCC). This means that the Constitutional
Court is awarded with mechanisms to control the observance of its own
jurisprudence by the other courts.
In
concrete-control
proceedings,
the
effects
of
the
unconstitutionality, expressed in a judgment of unconstitutionality, are
produced inter partes, i.e., are restricted to the concrete dispute within
which the issue has been raised. The restricted effects of these
judgments may however be expanded by the ConstitutionalCourt in one
situation. According to Article 281(3) CPR and Article 82 LCC, if a
norm has been judged unconstitutional in three concrete cases, the Public
Prosecutor or any of the Justices may promote a proceeding of
successive abstract control" of that norm.
Currently, concrete control of constitutionality accounts for more
than 90% of the cases submitted to the Constitutional Court. The
decisions of the Court in concrete-control proceedings may take four
forms: a summary decision, issued by the rapporteur judge; a decision
taken by the "conference" of three judges (on the appeals of summary
decisions or of decisions of non-admission by the other courts); a

11. Successive abstract control is abstract control that is not preventive, i.e., that
takes place after the legal provisions have been fully adopted and entered into force.
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decision issued by the "section" of five judges;12 and a decision of the
plenary.
Hence, if it is decided that there can be no ruling on the object of the
appeal or that the case is simple, the summary decision can be issued by
the rapporteur judge (Article 78-A(l) LCC). If there is an appeal of a
summary decision or of a decision of other courts which fails to admit
the appeal of constitutionality, the Court will rule on conference of three
judges (Article 78-A(3)(4)(5) LCC). In all other cases the Court will rule
on a section of five judges (Article 70 LCC). When the uniformity of the
jurisprudence of the Court is at risk, there may be an intervention of the
Plenary Session of the Court. The Plenary may be summoned on the
initiative of the President (Article 79(A) LCC) or on the basis of an
appeal grounded on the existence of a contradictory precedent (Article
79(D) LCC).
II.

CONDITIONS OF ADMISSIBILITY OF THE APPEAL

Before ruling on the merits of an appeal, appellate courts must first
check its admissibility. The courts a quo may refuse to admit the appeal
of constitutionality (Article 76 LCC) as it happens in Italy or Germany.
However, as it has already been mentioned, the selection of cases is
centralised in the Constitutional Court since all the decisions of the
courts a quo on admissibility may be appealed to that Court. Moreover,
the rapporteur judge in the Constitutional Court must always appreciate
the admissibility of the appeal. The conditions of admissibility of a
constitutionality appeal are set forth in Article 280 CPR and Article 70
LCC.
A.

A Question of Unconstitutionality(orReinforced Illegality)

The appeal of constitutionality can be lodged not only when a
constitutional problem is identified but also in some situations of
illegality that are specified in the Constitution and the LCC. The
Universal Declaration of Human Rights is a parameter of
constitutionality within the Portuguese system of control of
In fact, according to Article 16(2) CPR, the
constitutionality.
constitutional provision on fundamental rights must be interpreted and
integrated according to such Declaration.

12. In 2007 the Constitutional Court awarded, according to its internal statistic,
1,268 decisions in concrete control; 855 summary decisions; 211 conference decisions
and 206 plenary section decisions.
13. See Moura Ramos, 0 Tribunal ConstitucionalPortuguds e as Normas de outros
Ordenamentos Juridicos, in ESTUDOS EM MEM6RIA DO CONSELHEIRO Luis NUNES DE
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The European Convention on Human Rights or other international
documents on fundamental rights are not a formal parameter of
constitutionality.
However, they may have relevance to the
constitutionality judgment. The Court expressly admits the importance
of the Convention for the interpretation of the Constitution; it is not
excluded, however, that the Convention may have a wider role of
integration,14 namely when its provisions include non-written
fundamental rights compatible with the constitutional order (Article
16(1) CPR)" or as long as they may be considered an expression of
general principles of international law, belonging to the core of ius
cogens (Article 8(1) CPR). 16
The Constitutional Court can only rule if the appeal concerns a
problem of direct unconstitutionality, i.e., it can only decide whether the
application of the provision should have been refused according to what
the Constitution establishes. This means that the Court cannot appreciate
issues of illegality or whether a provision has been wrongfully applied to
the case, unless a constitutional parameter (or a parameter with
equivalent value for this specific purpose, namely, international treaties
or statutes with reinforced value) has been invoked.
B.

A Normative Question

The constitutionality appeal is exclusively aimed at the control of
norms (Article 280 CPR and Article 70 LCC). As Article 280 CPR
reads, an appeal may be made to the Constitutional Court against court
rulings that refuse the application of any norm on the grounds of its
unconstitutionality or that apply any norm whose unconstitutionality has
been raised during the proceedings in question. Concrete control is thus
exclusively normative. There is no specific procedure designed for the
review of the constitutionality of any other acts such as judicial or
administrative decisions. Only rules-or norms-can be the object of
concrete control of constitutionality in the way that it may derive in the
form of an appeal to the Constitutional Court.
Therefore, the Constitutional Court does not scrutinise the decisions
issued by ordinary courts-its jurisdiction is strictly concerned with the
normative constitutionality question raised in the dispute. There is a
review of neither the judicial decision of the court a quo nor of the

ALMEIDA 811 (2007). See also JORGE MIRANDA, MANUAL DE DIREITO CONSTITUCIONAL
IV 164-176 (Coimbra 4th ed. 2008).
14. See Ramos, supra note 13, at 812-14.
15. See ANDRADE, supra note 9, at 40.

16. See Moura Ramos, Rela(Oes entre a Ordem Interna e o Direito Internacionale
Comunitario,in DA COMUNIDADE INTERNACIONAL E DO SEU DiREiTO 272 (Coimbra 1996).
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interpretation given by such court to the applicable infra-constitutional
law.
Moreover, in any of the above situations the appeal will be admitted
only if the question of constitutionality is ratio decidendi of the contested
judicial decision. The judgment awarded-by the Constitutional Court
must be useful in that it should have a direct effect on the outcome of the
decision. Obiter dicta on constitutionality issues or ad ostentationem
arguments do not amount to a possible object of appreciation by the
highest Court of the constitutional jurisdiction.
Because of this broad concept of norm, it may sometimes be very
difficult to draw the line between what is a normative control or a
control of the decision itself The jurisprudence of the Court provides,
however, some criteria that may help to make the distinction and to
prevent cases of an eventual abuse of the concept of norm or normative
interpretation.17 When contesting a certain and concrete interpretation of
a norm, an appellant must clearly identify the content of such
interpretation. It is not sufficient to say, for example, that the norm, as it
has been applied, is in breach of the Constitution. The enunciation of the
normative criterion must observe the requisites of generality and
abstraction-this is very important because it clearly stresses that the
object of control will be a norm (even if not taken in the objective
meaning of the disposition where it is included) and not the judicial
decision. And such specification must be done in advance by the
appellant. The Court cannot substitute in its own definition and
delimitation of the object of the appeal of constitutionality; such is a
burden pending on the appellant. Moreover, the Court has also
repeatedly stated that it will admit appeals on normative interpretations
only so long as the interpretations can be supported, even if remotely, by
the literal content of the rule or rules to which they are attributed.
This means that in these situations the burden pending on the
appellant before bringing the case to the Constitutional Court is heavier.
He or she must not only raise the issue of constitutionality before the
ordinary courts have issued their final decision but should also pay extra
attention to the way such issue is raised in order to avoid imputing the
breach to the decision or to the judicial activity. The distinction between
what is part of the decision and what may be elected as a normative
criterion applied therein is sometimes very difficult to draw. It may be
possible to theoretically enounce, a propos of a case, a normative

17. See Rui Medeiros, A Forga Expansiva do Conceito de Norma no Sistema
Portugus de Fiscalizaqdo Concentrada da Constitucionalidade, in ESTUDOS EM
HOMENAGEM AO PROF. DOUTOR MARQUES GUEDES 183-202 (Coimbra 2004); see also
MEDEIROs, supra note 4, at 347.
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criterion, distinct from the judicial act of applying it to the dispute. But
if during the dispute the appellant has failed to identify such a criterion,
enouncing it in a way as to not clearly separate it from the concrete
situation under adjudication, then the appeal will not be admissible.
The question of knowing whether an alleged normative dimension
or interpretationcan be accepted as a norm for the purpose of concrete
control by the Constitutional Court is probably the most difficult
question relating to the procedural requirements of this type of control.
And the answers given by the Court have not been uniform over time and
are still today the subject of disagreement amongst the Judges and the
three different sections.
Sometimes legality and unconstitutionality are linked, especially in
situations involving the principle of legality (in criminal- and tax-law
cases). The Court sustains that it cannot control the process of
qualification of concrete facts under the norm of the law. For instance,
Plenary decision 674/99 concerned a case where the appellants, who had
been convicted of the practice of fraud, claimed that the court a quo had
included, within the criminal type, a different and further element
concerning mental reserve in the concept of astuteness. The Court then
decided that the object of the appeal did not concern any "norm" but
rather the judicial process of "concrete application" that had concluded
that the behaviour of the appellant fulfilled, in fact, the criminal type of
fraud.
However, the Court has further accepted-although with significant
dissident opinions-that although it cannot scrutinise the concrete
qualification of the facts, it may control the jurisprudentialconstruction
of general and abstract criteria by the ordinary courts if such
construction is harmful for the defendant in a criminal procedure.
According to this reasoning, the Court ruled on the admissibility of a
jurisprudential construction of a new cause of interruption or suspension
of the statute of limitations for crimes-see decisions 412/2003 and
110/2007 and plenary decision 183/2008. In all these cases the Court
assessed its jurisdiction to rule on the validity of such normative
construction stemming from the case law of ordinary courts and further
concluded that there was a breach of the constitutional principle of
criminal legality when excluding a cause for non-punishment.
C.

Legitimacy

The following people may file an appeal to the Constitutional Court:
persons who, in accordance to the law regulating the case in which the
decision was passed, have legitimacy to file an appeal, and in some
cases, the Public Prosecutor's Office (Article 72LCC).

PENN STATE INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

768

[Vol. 29:4

Although constitutionality issues are to be known ex officio, the
judge a quo is never allowed to submit the question to the Constitutional
Court. In the logic of a diffuse system, all the courts are competent to
decide matters of constitutionality. If a judge is competent to decide, he
or she should have no doubts. The logic is different of the preliminary
and incidental procedure to the Constitutional Court, that structures the
generality of systems with concentrated concrete control, 8 or the
preliminary ruling procedure to the European Court of Justice as set forth
in Article 234 EC on the basis of which the uniformity of European law
is guaranteed.
D.

Form of the Appeal

The request must be filed in written form but may be delivered to
the Court by the usual means allowed by the Civil Procedure Code
(Articles 150 CPC and 69 LCC).
According to Article 75-A(l) LCC, an appeal can be lodged to the
Constitutional Court only through the filing of a request in which the
appellant must identify:
(i) The applicable sub-paragraph of Article 70(1) LCC. This
provision specifies three main possibilities for appeal, according to the
decision a quo: decisions which have rejected the application of a rule
on the grounds of its unconstitutionality; decisions which have applied a
rule the unconstitutionality of which has been raised during the
proceeding; and decisions which have applied a norm which has already
been declared or judged' 9 unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court;
(ii) The provision the unconstitutionality or illegality of which the
Court is asked to examine and the constitutional provision or principle
considered to have been infringed;
(iii) The document in which the appellant raised the question of
unconstitutionality or the decision of the Constitutional Court that
previously judged unconstitutional the provision applied by the decision.
If the request for filing an appeal does not include any of the details
specified above, the judge shall invite the appellant to submit such
information within a period of ten days (Article 75-A(1) LCC).
E.

Lawyer
The appellant must be represented by a lawyer (Article 83(1) LCC).

18. See MARIA LOCIA AMARAL, Problemas da Judicial Review em Portugal, 10
THEMIS 74, 84 (2005).
19. According to Tribunal Constitucional [Constitutional Court] Decision 374/99
(Port.).
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Subsidiarity: Exhaustion ofRemedies

If the appeal is based on an alleged unconstitutionalityof a norm
that has not been sustained by the decision a quo, the party claiming such
unconstitutionality must first exhaust all the available remedies before
lodging the appeal to the Constitutional Court (Article 70(2) LCC).
Furthermore, that same party must always raise the question of
constitutionality before each higher court. In other words, the question
of unconstitutionality must never be abandoned by the party who wants
to resort to this procedure.
Only in rare situations-for example, when the interested party has
had no opportunity to raise the constitutionality question previously or
when there is a previous decision of the Constitutional Court-will the
Court admit appeals which are based on new constitutionality issues, i.e.,
issues which have been raised by the interested party only after the court
a quo has awarded its final decision.
Concrete control of constitutionality by the Constitutional Court, as
it has been set forth in the Constitution and the LCC, takes form in an
appeal which demands that the contested issue have already been
appreciated by the ordinary court or that, at least, such court have had the
procedural opportunity to do so.
III. NORMS AGAINST WHICH THE APPEAL ON GROUND OF
UNCONSTITUTIONALITY MAY BE RAISED

The Court has stated, from the outset, that the concept of norm-for
the purpose of concrete control of constitutionality-should not be
restricted to a specific provision of a normative act. In fact the concept
of "norm" adopted is simultaneously functional and formal. Formal
because the Court may assess provisions which, despite having an
individual and concrete nature, are contained in legislative acts-the
traditional requirements of generality and abstractiondo not provide for
a satisfying test. Functional because it must be appropriate as to define
the object of a control of constitutionality system as provided for in the
Constitution20-the jurisdiction of the Court is not concerned only with
the provisions in its textual expression in legal texts, which means that
the object of control is the norm and not the literal support.
We will now examine the main types of normative acts that may be
scrutinised by the Constitutional Court. 2 1 This is a mere exemplificative
20.
21.

See CANOTILHO, supra, note 7, at 932; ANDRADE, supra note 9, at 377.
See MIRANDA, supra note 9, at 178-90; CANOTILHO, supra note 7, at 935-39;

LOPEs Do REGO, "0 Objecto Id6neo dos Recursos de Fiscalizagao Concreta da
Constitucionalidade" Interpretaq~es Normativas Sindiciveis pelo Tribunal, 3
JURISPRUDENCIA CONSTITUCIONAL, Julho/Setembro, 2004, 5-7.
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enunciation-there may be other provisions which can integrate the
object of a concrete-control proceeding (such as the normative decrees
issued by the President of the Republic or the provisions of other legal
orders which are applicable in the Portuguese order 2 2).
A.

Legislative Acts

The usual object of a constitutionality appeal is a legislative act
(laws, decree-laws or regional decree-laws).
Any provision contained in a legislative act may be the object of a
constitutionality appeal, even if the provision is not general or abstract.
The concept of law, as the legislative act that may be the object of a
control of constitutionality proceeding, is thus a formal one.
For instance, facing the need to assess the constitutional conformity
of two decrees enacted by the Government which extinguished two
public companies-and thus contained provisions of an individual and
concrete nature-the Court asserted its jurisdiction since such legislative
acts should be considered normative for the purpose of concrete control
of constitutionality.23
B.

Administrative Regulations

Administrative regulations may also be scrutinised by the
Constitutional Court if they are directly in breach of Constitutional
provisions or principles. But this is not a general principle since it is
required that the provisions contained therein have a public nature. For
example, an internal regulation of a public company-on the prevention
of alcoholism-was considered as a purely private norm and thus was
not admitted as the object of a constitutionality appeal (decision 156/88).
The same decision was reached when the object consisted of provisions
of the Statute and the Discipline Regulation of the Portuguese Football
Federation (decision 472/89). However, a later judgment came to admit
an appeal on a provision of the Discipline Regulation of that Federation
(decision 730/95). And in 2005, although having ruled the appeal
inadmissible on different grounds, the Court accepted a provision of the
Regulation of the Justice Council of the Football Federation as a possible
object of a constitutionality appeal since the Federation had been
conferred public powers by law.

22. See Ramos, supra note 13, at 783-807.
23. See Tribunal Constitucional [Constitutional Court] Decision 26/85 (Port.)
(according to the Court, a norm would be any act enacted by the public powers that
entails a rule of conduct (for the individuals or to the Administration) or a criterion of
decision for the courts).
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Collective Work Agreements

Whether collective work agreements contain norms for the purpose
of control of constitutionality by the Court has generated an intense
debate that has lasted for the past fifteen years with division both on the
constitutional case law and among the legal doctrine. The vexata
quaestio has been answered in two opposite directions. Some authors
have failed to recognise a public character to these agreements. As far as
these opinions are concerned, such agreements are enacted by the private
will of the contracting parties and do not constitute any form of
autonomous law. Accordingly, for the purpose of concrete control of
constitutionality, the provisions of a collective work agreement lack the
public nature that must characterise any norm under a control-ofconstitutionality proceeding. This position was largely followed by the
predominant case law of the Constitutional Court until early 2008.
However, some minority judgments regarded collective agreements as
entailing norms adequate to be submitted to the Constitutional Court.
These judgments, dating back to a dissident opinion by Justice Jos6 de
Sousa e Brito (decision 172/93), led to a first plenary session, in 2005, to
discuss the issue. Decision 224/2005, with five dissident opinions,
enforced the predominant position of not admitting the constitutionality
appeal on these provisions. In 2008, however, following a change in the
Court's composition, the question was brought back to the Plenary on
initiative of the President according to Article 79-A(l) LCC. The
plenary then ruled on the admissibility of Clause 137 of the Collective
Work Agreement to the Banking Sector. The judgment (decision
174/2008) is mainly based on the dissident opinion abovementioned.
According to it, collective agreements entail general and abstract norms
that are potentially heteronomous. Furthermore, the normative character
of these norms is explicitly recognised by the Constitution that
establishes workers' fundamental right to regulate their status through
the celebration of collective agreements (Article 56(3) CPR). Moreover,
the Court acknowledges that relevance must be given to the fact that the
importance of collective agreements to regulate and establish the labour
regime is increasing-denying these norms the possibility of access to
the highest instance of the constitutional jurisdiction would thus be a
paradox.
D.

Rules ofJudicial Origin

The Court has accepted to review the constitutionality of a
procedural norm set forth by an arbitral tribunal. In fact, in decision
150/86 the Court stated that for the purpose of concrete control of
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constitutionality, the referring norms do not necessarily have to be
enacted in a legislative or regulative form. A further note on the
specification of what should be considered a norm was then added: the
provisions at stake should have their immediate validity parameter on the
Constitution. Furthermore, the clauses at stake were not deemed as
having been enacted by private autonomy since arbitral tribunals perform
a public function.
The Court has also agreed to control the rule stated at the end of a
decision for the unification of jurisprudence of the Supreme Courts
(Supreme Court of Justice and Administrative Supreme Court).24
More important, the Court appreciates the constitutionality of the
rules underlying a judicial decision. That means, as we have seen, the
"rule" as ratio decidendi in the sense of a Common Law system or the
norm of the case in the sense of Fikentscher's theory of the Fallnorm. In
these cases the Court deals with a concept of "norm" as a result of legal
interpretation. The concept of norm includes the norm built by analogy
in the terms of Article 10(l)(2) of the Portuguese Civil Code 2 5 and even
the norm to which Article 10(3) of the same Civil Code (in line of the
famous Article 1 of the Suisse Civil Code) makes reference: "the norm
that the interpreterhimself would create if he had to legislate within the
spirit of the system."26
Sometimes the Court rules on the constitutionality of a norm as far
as it is interpreted as including a typical case or situation. For instance,
in decision 155/2007 the Court decided
To declare unconstitutional, in violation of Articles 25, 26 and 32,
paragraph 4, of the Constitution of the Portuguese Republic, the rule
contained in Article 172, paragraph 1, of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, when interpreted to allow, without the permission of the
judge, the forced gathering of biological traces of a defendant for
determination of his genetic profile, when the latter has expressed his
explicit refusal to cooperate or to allow such collection.
In other situations the Court has ruled on the constitutionality of a
provision so far as it is interpreted as excluding a typical case or
situation. In decision 232/2004 the Court decided "To declare the
unconstitutionality of the provisions that allow for the expulsion of
foreigners for the practice of a crime when applied to foreigners who are
in charge of underage children of Portuguese nationality resident in
Portugal."
24. See Do REGO, supra note 21, at 6.
25. See MOREIRA, supra note 4, at 847.
26. In decision 264/98 the Court explicitly states that it is controlling the rule created
by the Supreme Court on the basis of the power given by Article 10(3) of the Civil Code.
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In a very controversial case the Court admitted to decide on a rule
created by abduction on the basis of two different legal provisions. In
decision 183/2008 the Court decided to overrule a precedent of the
Supreme Court and
to declare, with general force, the unconstitutionality, in violation of
Article 29, paragraphs 1 and 3, of the Constitution, the rule extracted
from the combined provisions of Article 119, paragraph 1, of the
Penal Code and Article 336, Paragraph I of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, in the interpretation that the prescription of prosecution
was suspended with the declaration of contumacy.
In the same line, the Court admitted, in decision 292/2008, to rule
on the constitutionality of the combined interpretation of Articles 483(1)
and 484, of the Civil Code, and Article 14 of the Statute of Journalists,
according to which compensation for harm to the good name of a legal
person takes place even when there is only unconscious guilt of the
journalist. This hypothetical norm allowed the Court to control the
specific balancing process (in the sense of German constitutional-law
scholar Robert Alexy) between two fundamental rights contained in the
decision of the ordinary court.
IV. CONCLUSIVE REFLEXION: SHOULD PORTUGAL HAVE A
CONSTITUTIONAL COMPLAINT?

Critics say that the many fundamental rights declared in the text of
the Constitution do not enjoy effective protection because it is not
possible to bring a direct action to the Constitutional Court on concrete
administrative acts and judicial decisions.27 Furthermore, critics claim
that, paradoxically, the system entails too many guarantees for cases
where no fundamental rights are at stake since the appeal on
constitutionality is not restricted to fundamental-rights issues.28
We must first note that the constitutionality of judicial decisions or
administrative acts is not, as such, excluded from the judicial order.
All ordinary courts may-and indeed have a duty to-scrutinise
administrative acts in order to assess their conformity with constitutional
provisions and principles (Article 266(2) CPR). The courts may confront
directly the administrative act against not only fundamental rights but
also any fundamental principle of administrative activity, such as
equality, legitimate expectations or proportionality.

27.

See CANOTILHO, supra note 7, at 939-43.

28. See NoVAIs, Em Defesa do Recurso de Amparo, in DIREITOs FUNDAMENTAIS:
TRUNFOS CONTRA A MAIORIA 159 (2006).
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Higher Courts, including the Supreme Court of Justice and the
Supreme Administrative Court, may also scrutinise judicial decisions in
order to assess their conformity with constitutional provisions and
principles. Such activity, however, may not forwardly be appreciated by
the Constitutional Court since its jurisdiction is strictly concerned to the
constitutionality of norms.
The question of assessing whether there is a breach on the system of
protection of fundamental rights must also take under consideration other
aspects that are not directly related to the system of judicial control of
constitutionality. It is true that as a rule, there is no direct action against
public acts. But there are some important exceptions 29 to this rule even
in what concerns administrative acts and norms. Article 268(5) CPR
established, since the 1997 amendment, the right of individuals to a
There are also other
proceeding against administrative norms.
administrative judicial proceedings specially designed for the protection
of fundamental rights: (i) summon for the protection of fundamental
rights, freedoms and guarantees (applicable when there is an imminent
violation of fundamental rights and there is no time for a preliminary
injunction); (ii) provisional judgment of a preliminary injunction (also
applicable in urgent cases related to fundamental rights, freedoms and
guarantees); (iii) exceptional review appeal by the Supreme
Administrative Court (in questions of fundamental legal and social
relevance-the Courts have held that this expression encompasses the
cases related to fundamental rights).
In judicial courts there are also special procedures for the protection
of fundamental rights. The Constitution establishes the priority nature of
any procedure designed for the protection of personal rights (Article
20(5) CPR). It also sets forth, in Article 31, the habeas corpus
proceeding against any illegal detention, which is directly appreciated by
the Supreme Court of Justice.
Furthermore we must take into account the broad concept of norm.
If, for instance, a higher court were to allow the use of torture on a
suspect of terrorism, without a specific provision but only on the basis of
an analogy or a supra-legal unwritten justification, could the
Constitutional Court admit an appeal on the decision? As we have
already seen the answer might be positive if the appellant were to
successfully formulate the constitutionality question in normative terms:
the Court might acknowledge ruling on the norm that had been applied
by the ordinary court.

29.

See ANDRADE, supra note 9, at 376.
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The broad concept of "norm" renders the Constitutional Court a
"Court of the Citizens."30 In global terms, the Portuguese system of
concrete control of constitutionality may come to results similar to the
results of the "constitutional complaint."
The main criticism that can be levied against the system is the
relative uncertainty of the normative question criterion,' particularly
when taking into account the fact that the criterion is not uniformly
applied by all judges. The system is therefore lying upon a question
whose answer is not always predictable: is there a "norm" at stake?
However, both the amparo3 2 and the individual constitutional
complaint systems also face the issue of filtering mechanisms against
excessive use. Such filtering mechanisms are based in relatively
undetermined concepts, which means that there is a common problem
pertaining to the jurisprudential concretisation of those mechanisms.
Should such control rely more on the formal definition of the object of
the procedure or on the relevance of the rights that have potentially been
offended? Perhaps the latter option would be preferable.
This might lead to the conclusion that the advantages of an
individual constitutional complaint system would outweigh those of a
purely normative control. However, such a solution would have a
paradoxical consequence. As the Constitutional Court would no longer
be limited by the normative criterion, its competence would overlap the
competence of the other courts, which can directly decide cases of
constitutionality issues. Since the appeal to the Constitutional Court
presupposes, as a rule, the exhaustion of legal remedies, the Court would
remain as the third or fourth instance of appeal, and that would probably
render impossible its functioning. Such a scenario would impose a
redefinition of the concrete-control system through the abrogation of the
diffuse control with decision on the merits by all courts and the
introduction of a preliminary and incidental procedure to the
Constitutional Court3 3 with additional filtering mechanisms. The whole
system should then be changed in the search of a new equilibrium.
There are, however, alternatives within the existing system towards
a wider protection of fundamental rights by the Constitutional Court.
The most obvious, and perhaps most coherent, of them all would be a

30. See MEDEIROS, supra note 17, at 214.
31. See PINTo, supra note 2, at 214.
32. See Ant6nio de Araurjo and J.A. Teles Pereira, Justiga Constitucional nos 30
anos da Constituigdo Portuguesa: Uma Aproximagdo Iberica, in LA CONSTITUCION
PORTUGUESA. UN ESTUDIO ACADEMICO TREINTA Aios DESPUlS, 226 (Javier Rajadura
Tejada ed., 2006).
33. See AMARAL, supra note 18, at 89-90 (on the introduction of a preliminary
incidental procedure in the Portuguese system of constitutional control).
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clearer and more uniform assumption of the functional concept of norm.
The appeals could then be filtered through summary decisions on the
merits based on the precedent culture, which already encompasses the
case law of the Court.

